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Administrative law and adjudication has had its fair share of legal analysis,
scholarship and commentary in our nation, and certainly the role, evolution, and
work product of the administrative law judge has been an important subset within
this area of inquiry. It is fair to say, however, that distinctions based on workload
character, features, and time demands have not always had their fair share of
comparative and analytical study.' More to the point of this article, "high case
*Vice President for Policy and Advocacy, The National Council on the Aging,
Inc. Formerly, Associate Commissioner for Hearings and Appeals, Social Security
Administration (1991-95), Chair and Chief Judge, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board,
Department of Commerce (1982-84) and Director, Education and Training Division,
Federal Judicial Center (1986-91). The views, conclusions and characterizations set
forth in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions
or positions of the author's former employing agency or entity. The author is grateful
for the help and cooperation of many officials of the adjudication agencies examined in
the study effort that underlies the article (most of whose names are listed in the concluding
appendix and whose releases and publications are cited throughout the article) but assumes
responsibility for all content, factual and otherwise. See Appendix B for a list of these
officials.
'What appears to be more common in terms of comparative examinations of
administrative adjudication systems are general studies of adjudication within a given
subject matter or governmental sector, e.g., Hoberg, Administrative Hearings:Central
Panels in the 1990's, 46 Admin. L. Rev. 75 and 14 J. Nat. Assn. Admin. L. Judges 107
(1994); Verkuil, Gifford, Koch, Pierce, & Lubbers The Federal Administrative Judiciary
(monograph, Admin. Conference of the U.S., Aug. 1992); Bloch, Assessing Disability:
A Six Nation Study of Disability Pension Claim Processing and Appeals, 47 Intl. Soc.
Sec. Rev. 15(1994); Skoler & Weixel, Social Security Adjudication in Five Nations:
Some International Perspectives and Comparisons, 33 Admin. L. Rev. 269 (1981),
Skoler, Trademark Appeal, Opposition, and Cancellation Procedure in Six Nations: A
Comparative Examination, 74 Trademark Reporter 367 (1985); Skoler, Appeal Rights
for the Elderly in Major Benefit Programs, 3 Bifocal 1 (ABA, April/May 1982). For a
recent and refreshing comparative focus on management of administrative adjudication
systems, see Weaver, Management of ALJ Offices in Executive Departments and
Agencies, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 303 (1995Xreview of 11 federal adjudicative operations,
most not "high volume" and most involving judges subject to APA).
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volume" systems have rarely been compared as a group and held to light in terms of
their peculiar characteristics. Also relevant to the inquiry are the difficult dilemmas
of maintaining due process principles while providing a quick and economical day
in court to endless lines of litigants aggrieved with some action or determination of
a government agency, whether federal, state or local.2
The paucity of scholarship focusing on high-volume administrative
adjudication at various levels of government is all the more striking because of the
great diversity and disparate demands which press on administrative tribunals in this
country' A look at the federal scene offers a good case in point. Among tribunals
operating subject to the dictates of the federal Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),4 the Social Security Administration's administrative law judge (ALJ) corps
dramatically outdistances all others in case volume and number ofjudges with its
more than 1,100 ALJs and 550,000 annual case receipts. That corps accounts for
roughly 80 percent of all APAjudges and, quite likely, an even greater proportion
of APA case filings. Indeed the Social Security corps emerges as four times the
aggregate size of all other APA tribunals combined (there are about 30 of them).
Following some distance behind in size are the two labor dispute tribunals, the
Department of Labor and National Labor Relations Board corps. These comprise 60
2All high volume courts examined, with the exception of the California
Workers Compensation Boards and the federal Board of Veterans Appeals, have
experienced appreciable workload increases since the beginning of the decade. See, e.g.,
Cal. WCAB Statistical Table (1995) showing a leveling off in total case filings since
1992 (i.e., 230,500 in 1992 and 220,500 in 1994) and VBA Report of the Chairman: FY
1994 at p.2, indicating a decrease in appeals carried to completion and certified to the
Board for review (i.e., from 44,000 in Fy 1990 to 38,000 in Fy 1993.
3For a glimpse of this diversity and its disparities at the federal level, see
Verkuil, Gifford, Koch, Pierce & Lubbers, supra n. I at ch. 111.
45 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 1306, 3105, 3344, 5372, & 7521,
originally enacted as ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)
'U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Total Number of Judges on Board by
Grade and Agency (unpublished chart, Nov. 11, 1995) (showing 30 agencies with APAjudges aggregating 1, 377 ALJ's, 1, 112 or 80.7% of which were members of the Social
Security Corps.
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and 66 judges respectively (both operating at 80-judge levels in the recent past) and
currently handle less than 9,000 case filings per year. After that, size drops
dramatically. There are only a handful of tribunals with judicial work forces in
excess often. These include the Coast Guard (ten ALJs) and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (20 ALJs). The remainder and great majority of APA
adjudicative corps include one to nine judges (most in the lower reaches of that
scale).6 To further accentuate the contrasts, the massive SSA corps conducts
non-adversary hearings (i.e., no government representation) in contrast to virtually
all other APA tribunals and carries positive legal obligations to assist claimants in
evidentiary development and case presentation. This generates support staff ratios
not found in other federal tribunals (currently one judge to 4.5 support staff).
To explore the larger federal "high-volume" AU corps after Social
Security, one needs to look to non-APA ranks such as the Department of Justice's
Immigration Judge Corps (approaching 200 judges) and the adjudicators of the
Merit System Protection Board (more than 75 judges).7 Emphasis on federal APA
strictures or coverage as a key to comparative scholarship or issue analysis seems
to have been an important factor in the past but may be somewhat misguided today
since close examination reveals that virtually all high volume tribunals, via
regulation or legislation, must adhere to most of the protections and adjudication
rules and principles incorporated in the APA (and most of the state APAs).
Whatever the case, it appears that if one wishes to examine questions of
management of large caseloads and staff complements and of techniques for proper
and constitutional disposition of long line-ups of appeals from agency decisions, one
6Id. (showing 21 of the 30 AU corps, or 70%, with 7 or less judges on board).
7There is currently no APA corps beyond Social Security with more than
10,000 case receipts annually, even for the two which exceed 50 ALJs (Department of
Labor at 60 judges and National Labor Relations Board at 67 judges). Neither of these
have average disposition rates of more than 12 cases per judge per month ( which is
considerably below "per judge" rates of the administrative tribunals examined in this
review).
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must cross lines: lines of APA versus non-APA operation, lines of federal versus
state government responsibility, and lines distinguishing between large, complex
case disputes and repetitive "short cause" litigation.
In the fall of 1995, the author conducted a comparative study of some of
the nation's high volume adjudication operations. The occasion was the
establishment of a task force to consider improvement of the organization and
structure of hearing operations consistent with, and in furtherance of, a recently
completed reengineering study of the process which accounts for 90 percent of
SSA's annual half million case receipts." These are disability claims under titles 2
and 16 of the Social Security Act9 which, due to unprecedented case filings in the
early 1990s, brought the agency by mid-decade to an annual filings rate in excess of
550,000 cases. The pending backlog is of equal size and, perhaps most important
to the individual and disadvantaged claimants typically served, involves an
unacceptable average decision span of almost one year for just the appeal portion
of the disability process. This time period encompasses filing of an appeal to
issuance of an AU decision or, in some cases, issuance of an appellate remand to
the date of a new ALJ decision."0
Seven agencies were selected for the SSA "bench marking" effort with the
choice based largely on operation size and case volume. The seven systems
ultimately selected each exceeded 50 judges and 50,000 annual case receipts. Those
dual criteria produced, beyond the SSA giant, two other federal corps (both
sSee Social Security Admin., Plan for a New Disability Claim Process (SSA
Pub. No. 01-005, 69 pp., Sept 1994) and Disability Process Redesign: Next Steps in
Implementation (SSA Pub. No. 01-006,39 pp., Nov. 1994); see also Process Reengineering
Program: Disability Reengineering Project Plan, 59 Fed. Reg. 47,887-930 (Sept. 19, 1994)
942 U.S.C. §§401 et seq. and §§1381 et seq.
1Sec Soc. Sec. Admn., 1994 Annual Report to the Congress, p.12 (July 1994)
(then showing 1993 receipts of 509,000 AU hearing requests and processing time of
9 months); cf. SSA Office of Hearings and Appeals, OHA Caseload Analysis, Fy 1995
(unpublished charts, 10/19/95) showing 582,473 hearing receipts and 349 days average
processing time at beginning of the current fiscal year (October 1, 1995).
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non-APA), four state corps, and one foreign system. To this group was added, of
course, the Social Security Administration's Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA),
yielding an eight-system study handling a rather diverse selection of appeal causes
but wedded by a common bond of high volume caseload as a predominant system
feature, with a need for short hearing time (typically one hour or less for most high-
volume categories), quick decisional response, high judge productivity (30 or more
written decisions per month per judge) and docketing/scheduling practices capable
of efficiently handling these endless lines of short causes. The following systems,
then, constitute the grist for this study.
o Board of Veterans' Appeals, U.S. Department of Veterans' Affairs
o Immigration Judge Corps, U.S. Department of Justice
o Office of Administrative Hearings, New York Department of Social
Services
o Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings
o California Worker's Compensation Appeals Boards
o Appeals Division, Illinois Department of Employment Security
o British Independent Tribunal Service
o Office of Hearings and Appeals, Social Security Administration
Short "snapshots" of each of the above systems, skewed somewhat to the
bench marking study's focus on organization, structure and management of appeal
systems, are included as appendices to the article." Relevant characteristics will be
identified and compared as key issues and features are explored in the text ahead
(with occasional reference to high-volume operations other than the particular
subjects of this review). It should be noted that although the underlying study was
focused on hearing system management and structure, the study's protocols also
covered operational features and tools such as "bench decisions," use of decision
" See Appendix A. All profiles have been examined by the respective agencies
under review and suggested edits and adjustments have been incorporated..
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"macros," and prehearing screening and settlement practices. 2 These subjects are
examined and compared where relevant.
Locus and Identity of Adjudication Operation in Agency Structure.
Of the eight programs under scrutiny, only two were structurally
"independent" of the agencies whose disputes they adjudicated. The Maryland
Office of Administrative Hearings is a distinct and separate entity in the state
executive branch, reporting directly to the Governor and serving many other state
agencies."' This is typical of the several central panel adjudication corps now
operating in the United States.'4 The United Kingdom's Independent Tribunal
Service is, in effect, a component of the British judiciary reporting to the Lord
Chancellor ( the official who directs that nation's judicial and court apparatus), but
is nevertheless dependent on the Social Security Department for its budget and hears
only social insurance cases.' The Board of Veterans' Appeals, Justice Department
Immigration Corps, New York Office of Administrative Hearings, and Illinois
Employment Security Appeals Division are organizationally distinct from the
program components whose cases they adjudicate, but nevertheless are still housed
in the agencies whose disputes they service.'6 The two largely independent
12 All high volume adjudication operations have been exploring and adopting
innovations of this kind. For a national view within the state "fair hearing" adjudication
context, see, Cal. Dept. of Social Services, Survey of Nationwide Fair Hearing Practices,
Exec. Summ. & Table 2.4 (Div. of Admin. Adjudications, Dec. 1993)..
"This is reflected in the Agency's basic enabling legislation, Md. State Govt.
Code Ann. §9-1602 et seq. (1993). Its independent agency structure is outlined in
Hardwicke, The Central Hearing Agency: Theory and Implementation in Maryland,
14 J. Natl. Assn. Admin L. Judges 5 (1994).
14Hardwicke, Id. at App. 1, Table 2 ("Place in Govt." column). The 1981
revision of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act incorporated the independent
central panel system concept, § § 4-301,4-202(a).
"See correspondence, K. Bassingthwaighte, President, Independent Tribunal
Service (March 31, 1995) (" As judicial and administrative head of the Independent
Tribunal Service, I do not officially 'report to anyone. However, the Service is funded
by the Department of Social Security and I have regular contact with the Secretary of
State for Social Security who is the political head of the Department and a Cabinet
Minister...'.)
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adjudication entities (Great Britain and Maryland) were about as current with their
high-volume workloads as any units in the study, and were in much better shape than
the SSA hearing operation that served as the focus of the review. These entities
essentially matched case receipts with case disposition and evidenced no more than
the normal backlogs necessary to keep adjudication operations moving along without
increased waiting time. 7 Thus it was hard to find that the "independence factor"
carried any discernible costs in adjudication timeliness and efficiency.
Of the several units within a common agency umbrella but enjoying a clear
organizational separation from the initial claims component whose decisions fed the
appeals system, the variations in case currency and timeliness were substantial.
Some were quite curent (Illinois, California, New York) and some quite far behind
(SSA and Veterans' Appeals).' 8 Support or documentation for any conclusion or
" The Immigration Corps is in the Justice Department's Executive Office of
Immigration Review but services Immigration and Naturalization Service cases; the
New York Office of Administrative Appeals is in the State Department of Social Services
but adjudicates appeals emanating from county offices; and the Illinois Employment
Security Appeals Division is within the State Department of Employment Security but
services cases arising in local offices of the Operations Division. Social Security's Office of
Hearings and Appeals is in the SSA Office of Program, Policy, Evaluation and
Communications but services disputed claim determinations of state offices called
"Disability Detennination Services" providing contract claim examination services to SSA.
"
7
"The ITS caseload, i.e., number of appeals received (all jurisdictions] is
around 200,000. Recent figures show that clearances matched our intake figures last
year". Letter from K. Basingthwaighte, President, British ITS (Mar. 31, 1995). For
Maryland OAH, official statistics for Calendar 1995 show receipts of 43,400 new cases
and dispositions of 44,100 cases, a 600 case decrease in appeals carried over from the
prior year in a workload continuously growing by the addition of new adjudication
responsibilities (e.g., child abuse and neglect hearings and hearings for seven state
regulatory boards in 1994 and firearm sale violations, food stamp trafficking, state
university personnel disputes, and gaming commission hearings in 1995). See 1994 and
1995 Annual Reports, pp. 8-9 and 9-10, respectively. MOAHs record involved a
backlog-to-annual receipts ratio of about 17% (compare BVA and SSA ratios, infra
n. 18).
"
8The Board of Veterans' Appeals volume of pending cases rose from 22,000
in Fy 1992 to 59,000 in Fy 1995 a 168% increase in 3 years time and a backlog-to-receipts
ratio of about 150%). BVA, Report of the Chairman, Fiscal Year 1994, p.3 9 (1995) and
Fiscal Year 1995, p.3 1 (1996). Similarly, SSA pending cases rose from 218,000 in Fy 1992
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preference as to greater structural or operational integration was simply not found,
at least at the analytical levels and depth permitted by the review.
Regional and Geographic Organization of Adjudication Services.
The review offered some interesting insights on the need and options for
geographic distribution and oversight of both hearing offices and
oversight/supervisory entities. Social Security, quite understandably in view of its
massive size and national scope, exhibits the largest network of hearing offices
(more than 130) and intermediate management centers (ten regional offices). As for
hearing sites, it is only natural to distribute these throughout the operative
jurisdiction and most agencies seem to have developed a rational and serviceable
network of locations to meet their needs and geographic makeup. For example, six
regions were established for the United Kingdom beyond the London area, 9 and two
remote offices exist in Maryland at either end of a geographically small state2' with
a focus on a large central hearing facility in the Baltimore area handling 40 percent
of hearings. Similar arrangements exist in Illinois, New York and California.2 In
all cases there was a fair amount of travel to less populous sites using a variety of
hearing facilities: public buildings, rented commercial space, sister agency or local
to 547,000 in Fy 1995 (a 150% increase in 3 years time and a backlog-to-receipts ratio of
94%). SSA Office of Hearings and Appeals, Key Workload Indicators: Fiscal Year 1995,
p.1 ( Jan. 1996).
"Wikeley, Social Security Appeals in Great Britain, 40 OHA Law Journal 1,9
(Fall 1944) (South East, South West, North East, North West, Midlands, Wales and
Scotland).
2 The two "satellite" offices were established in Salisbury (for the Eastern
shore) and Cumberland (for the Western Maryland area) to insure adequate hearing
facilities and reduce travel costs. See 1994 Annual Report, pp. 9-10 (1995). As with the
New York operation, all cases are still assigned centrally from headquarters.
2 California Workers Compensation maintains 28 district hearing offices
clustered within three regions (Northern, Central and Southern); Illinois operates
without regions, using 5 agency-maintained hearing offices and stationing judges in
certain departmental local claim offices to provide for responsive and accessible claims
service; and New York functions with some regional offices around the state and a
major processing operation in New York City as an adjunct to Albany headquarters. See
relevant profiles, Appendix A.
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government offices operated for purposes other than adjudication. Three variations
in the foregoing mix were quite interesting to the SSA bench marking effort:
OThe Immigration Corps' maintenance of a regional oversight function for
its hearing facilities without the expense and layering of regional offices. That
involves the installing eight assistant chief judges in the Washington area
headquarters office. These judges have regional oversight responsibilities, a duty
to "ride circuit" with moderate frequency in order to maintain a management
presence among its 32 hearing offices ("immigration courts"), and a duty to hear
some cases in the assigned region and maintain a "close to the front line" attitude and
perspective. In addition, there is the ability to meet frequently and quickly as a
headquarters group to deal with systemic problems and adjudication policy/rules on
a proactive, consistent, and uniform basis.22
*The New York system of unitary administration of the hearing operation
within a fairly large geographic state from a single headquarters location. This is in
the context of (i) a handful of regional offices serving as base stations for housing
and supervision of the state's hearing officer judges (rather than providing any
significant measure of administrative support) and (ii) a large New York City
processing center treated almost as a "next door" headquarters adjunct through
electronic linkage and use of Albany managers to direct the city unit (except for first
line supervision of clerical teams).2 3
0llinois' abandonment of a rigid "separate hearing office" priority in order
to "outstation" judges directly and permanently in a number of local offices (currently
about 15) where the communities are too small to support a cost- efficient local
hearing office. Here the referee judges work side by side with initial level
2 See relevant profile, Appendix A. The Board of Veterans' Appeals also
operates centrally and without its own regions but relies on the DVA's 50+ regional
offices to accept appeals, negotiate settlements and conduct informal hearings, thereby
resolving nearly half of the appeals arising yearly.
S3See relevant profile, Attachment A.
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processors while maintaining mandated independence of action and avoiding the ex
parte communication strictures of the state administrative procedure act.2 4
The Social Security Administration reacted rather coolly to suggestions
during advocacy and Congressional action on the recent "independent corps"
legislation that its ten regional management offices could be abandoned with
substantial savings and no harm to the efficiency of the massive SSA adjudication
operation. 5 The Immigration Corps solution of national program management
would seem to offer a viable alternative at a time of wholesale abandonment, under
recent Presidential "reinventing government" principles, of the standard ten-region
management structures prescribed for most federal departments. Similarly, the New
York and Illinois experiences have given the field examples of delayering options
providing good and pervasive service coverage and a lean central headquarters
oversight function, that may serve as models for large high-volume adjudication
systems.
Reporting Channels and Authorities for High Volume Adjudication Systems.
The Chief Judge of the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings reports
directly to the state Governor. The President Judge of the British Independent
Tribunal Service reports, if to anyone, directly to the Lord Chancellor, that official's
appointing authority. All other adjudication operations in this review report to a
higher official in the agency whose disputes they are charged to adjudicate, more
often than not someone below the agency head. Thus, the Chief Judge of the
24 See 5 IIl.Comp.Stat. 100/1 et seq. (Illinois APA) and, in particular, 100/10-5
(Administrative Hearings).
25See floor remarks of Senator H. Brown, cosponsor of S.486., 103d Cong.
prior to Senate approval of that bill in Nov. 1993 (Cong. Record, S. 15563, Nov. 19,
1993) suggesting elimination of SSA's Office of Hearings and Appeals 10 regional
offices, based on Congressional Budget Office estimates of $11 million in annual
savings from resulting staff and leasing cost cutbacks (letter, D. Reischauer to Chair,
Senate Judiciary Committee, Sept. 23, 1993) and recommendation of OHA's ALJ
Association.
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Immigration Corps reports to the Director of the Office of Immigration Review.
This office houses several other administrative adjudication functions, including the
Board of Immigration Appeals and a small corps of APA-qualified administrative
law judges who deal with illegal employment for aliens, immigration-related
document fraud, and discrimination arising out of alien status.26 The Director of the
Office of Immigration Review reports to the Attorney General's Office (i.e., to the
Deputy Attorney General). The Director of the New York Office of Administrative
Hearings (also a deputy general counsel) reports to the General Counsel of the State
Department of Social Services who, in turn, reports to the New York Commissioner
of Social Services. The Chief Judge of the SSA administrative law judge corps
reports to the Associate Commissioner for Hearings and Appeals who, in turn,
reports to the Deputy Commissioner for Program, Policy, Evaluation and
Communications and thence to the Commissioner of Social Security.27
Similar trails of accountability could be traced in the other systems of this
review but perhaps worthy of note is the fact that, among the foregoing named
systems, the "direct reporting to the chief' adjudication programs are among the
most current in the high-volume sample.' This hardly establishes, however, that
such a delayered relationship is a sine qua non of adjudicative efficiency since
268 U.S.C. §§ 1324a,1324b & 1324c.
" There has been both discomfort and some criticism of the remote reporting
hierarchy from adjudication system leadership to SSA's agency head (Commissioner of
Social Security). It seems quite likely that the reorganization workgroup study now
underway will ultimately provide for more direct accountability of OHA leaders (Chief
Judge and Associate Commissioner for Hearing and Appeals) to the Commissioner's
Office. As regards the danger of interference with decisional independence by non-ALJ
managers (as opposed to Chief ALJ managers), one commentator has found no empirical
evidence for such concerns and at least co-equal ability to deal effectively and efficiently
with administrative responsibilities involved in adjudication system administration, see
Weaver, supra, n.1 at 318-19 and 324-26.
2 These systems would be British ITS (currently matching receipts with
dispositions) and Maryland OAH (operating at 95%+ levels in ratio of dispositions to
annual receipts).
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several more layered systems ( e.g., Immigration, New York Administrative
Hearings, and Illinois Employment Security) have a recent history of almost
comparable currency. What may be the greater key to the timeliness issue, beyond
the provision of reasonably adequate human and material resources to keep up with
burgeoning caseloads, is the organizational culture, authority and capacity for quick,
decisive, and proactive management decision making and flexibility regardless of
nominal layers of accountability. A high-volume system may well tolerate a
reporting relationship to lower executive levels so long as the configuration is
capable of quick, decisive and intelligent oversight, empowerment for innovation
and course correction action, and access to rapid answers and policy calls from
higher authority when required -- something which is not always easy to come by for
large operations, adjudicative or otherwise.
The Pressures and Presence of Time Limits.
It is clear that the bulk of high-volume adjudication systems in this nation
operate under legal time constraints. Since state-federal entitlement program
adjudication and unemployment compensation adjudication are subject to federal
time limits as a condition of needed funding, this is a "rule of the game" that must be
confronted in every large state with receipts of the order examined in this review29
It is also a factor that weighs on the minds of managers of such programs as well as
adjudicators. Thus, for Medicaid and AFDC appeals, adjudicators face 90-day
limits for issuance of final decision from the date of request for hearing. In the case
of Food Stamp fair hearings, there is a 60-day limit from hearing request to decision
and notification.3" In the employment security field (unemployment insurance
29. Some states go beyond federal timeliness requirements and impose their
own at particular stages of the appeals process. See 56 1E1. Admin. Code, ch. iv, §
2720.345 (claimants can assert right to sue in courts if Board of Review does not issue
decision within 120 days of appeal from referee decision); see also n. 32, infra.
'0 42 CFR 431.244(f)(Medicaid); 45 CFR 205.10 (AFDC); 7 CFR 273.15(c)
(Food Stamps, also includes a 45-day limit for local level hearings appealable for state
level review).
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benefits), tolerances are even closer. Applicable federal regulations impose
promptness limits of 30 days for issuance of 60 percent of all appeals decisions and
45 days for 90 percent.3 '
States themselves may impose decisional time limits. The Maryland
central corps operation finds itself not only subject to federal time limits but also to
a number of state-imposed limits (legislative and regulatory) and a comprehensive
set of "time frames" for virtually every type of administrative adjudication conducted
by its ALJs . The Maryland APA specifically requires issuance of central panel
decisional products, whether final case dispositions, findings of fact, conclusions of
law, or proposed orders (depending on the scope of the various delegations of
decisional authority from state agencies using the central panel for adjudication
work) within 90 days after completion of hearings." The delegating agency, if its
approval is required (as with proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and
orders), must then take its final action within 60 days after receipt of the Office of
Administrative Hearings adjudication product."4
It is the federal high-volume systems that appear to be largely free of
timeliness mandates. Moreover, federal courts have been rather strict when
desperate agencies (or desperate trial courts) have sought to impose limits in the face
of unacceptable delay records in administrative tribunal operations." This may be
unfortunate. The tide and temper of the times seem to suggest that (i) timeliness is
31See 20 CFR §650.1 (rationale of timeliness standard) & 650.4(bXnumerical
test).
"See Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings, 1994 Annual Report, p.
8 & app. 2 (1995) and, for other than statutory time limits, Office of Administrative
Hearings, Time Frames for Decisions (rev. 10/23/95).
"Md. Code Ann., § 10-220(cX1994 Cum. Supp.Xlimit may be extended by
agency head).
" Md. Code Ann., § 10-220(cX1994 Cum. Supp.Xlimit may be extended by
agency head).
"See, e.g., Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104 (1984Xrejecting trial court imposition
of mandatory deadlines for the agency's extreme delay in making reconsideration
determinations and conducting evidentiary hearings on disability claims).
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very much a critical ingredient, certainly for the quality and responsiveness ofjustice
and also for de facto achievement of at least the spirit of "due process of law" and
(ii) given minimally reasonable resources and the finn resolve of mandates, courts
and administrative tribunals can design and adjust their work to maintain and
reconcile due process requirements with timely and prompt case processing.
Timeliness requirements can take many forms. The federal regulatory
prescriptions are operated more as a spur to general averages and results than as
rigid prescriptions for every case.36 The Congress, following great concern about
lagging adjudicators in Article III courts, mandated a form of "public humiliation"
in the Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1990 by requiring periodic publication of the
names of judges with excessive numbers of old, unprocessed civil bench trials and
civil motions (a technique never visited on the federal administrative judiciary)."
Lack oftimeliness, under recent ethical standards for U.S. District Court judges can,
in appropriate circumstances, constitute or contribute to a finding of Code of Judicial
Conduct violations.3" Moreover, performance evaluation standards for non-APA
adjudicators can (and do) incorporate timeliness as one rating factor capable of
impacting on promotion opportunities, bonus awards, etc.39
36The general standard, from which specific "number of days" and "percentage
of cases" limits are derived, is the mandate that cases be decided "with the greatest
promptness that is administratively feasible". See 20 CFR §650.1-3 (1995 ed.). This
standard is derived for unemployment compensation adjudication from the Supreme
Court decision in Cal. Dept. of Human Resources v. Java, 204 U.S. 121 1972).
" Public Law 101-650 (1990).38See Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canons 3A.(5X"judges
should dispose promptly of the business of the court") and 3.B.(5)(judges with supervisory
authority over other judges "should take reasonable measures to assure the timely and
efficient performance of their duties"); also, American Bar Association, Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, Canon 3.B.(8XAug. 1990) ("a judge shall dispose of all judicial matters
promptly, efficiently and fairly").
9 For a federal tribunal example, see the performance plan for administrative
trademark judges of the Department of Commerce (Form CD-516F, 6-93) where the
critical performance element of "preparation of timely and well reasoned decisions"
commands 65% of the rating weight for these adjudicators. Also, under recent
Congressional mandate, Board of Veterans' Appeals judges will be subjected to
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This represents something of a digression from the focus of the SSA bench
marking review but it does appear that time constraints, when prescribed by law,
regulation, or other valid directive, can and have served as a prod to improved
results and high levels of achievement within high-volume operations. That
certainly seemed to be the case in Illinois, Maryland and New York for the tribunals
operating under such time constraints and also in a rare instance of federal tribunal
legislative time limits (Immigration Corps).' In these systems, moreover, a focus
on adjudication quality and accuracy, on training, and on streamlining to foster
efficiency and speed without losing (and perhaps even enhancing) energies available
for substantively solid performance seemed not to be missing or lost merely because
of mandated dispositional deadlines.41
By and large, deadlines appear to have been a positive factor in high-
volume workloads where disposing of cases with excessive delay may be as harmful
to ultimate justice as not disposing at all. The stakes of the "mandatory time limits"
game will likely increase in the future as resources and budgets for all government
activities come under new pressures.
Case Volume Pressures and Rates.
recertification at least once every three years under performance standards which
include, per present plans, a timeliness element (P.L. 103-271, 103d Congress). Moreover,
at least 23 states, in their "fair hearing" adjudication activities incorporate timeliness
performance standards. See California Survey of Nationwide Fair Hearing Practices, supra
n. 12 at Table 4.2.4
1Under the Refugee Act of 1980 ( now Section 208 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act), immigration judges are obliged to adjudicate asylum status determinations
within 180 days following application for asyium by the immigrant if the initial INS asylum
adjudicator cannot act favorably and files for immigration judge review within 75 days. This
constitutes a very real time limit since if the judge does not comply, the alien will have a
right to issuance of working papers. This time limited workload is quite substantial, i.e.,
about 10% of cases handled.
41See California Survey of National Fair Hearing Practices , supra n. 12 at
Tables 2.1 & 4.1 (Dec. 1993), indicating that (i) states under court pressure to meet
federal time limits in "fair hearing" entitlement cases generally make operational changes
to achieve the timeliness standards and (ii) "timely" states tend to hold longer hearings and
write longer decisions than "untimely" states.
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One can only stand in awe of the current SSA disposition rates (over
500,000 cases in 1995) and AU decisional output (45 dispositions per month per
judge in 1995, excluding a modest number of screened non-hearing cases essentially
"worked" without judge or hearing office staff input but requiring final judge
sign-off).42 These were rates achieved with no decrease in appellate court affirmation
rates and, indeed, with significant reductions in reversals or remands emanating from
federal reviewing courts.43 Yet, these case volumes are quite comparable to
productivity in the other high-volume courts examined if one were to assume
comparable numbers of adjudicators and comparable (or lesser) support staff ratios,

















































42The screened case category amounted to some 13,600 favorable decisions
within SSA's overall volume of 526,743 ALJ hearing level dispositions in Fy 1995.
SSA, Accountability Report for Fiscal Year 1995, p. m-47 (Dec. 1995).
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NE=: (a) First two columns are approximations based on the agencies' most
recently completed fiscal years. "Total Judges" includes, for British ITS, the full
time equivalents of its large part-time adjudicative force.
(b) Last two columns represent estimates conservatively rounded
downward as to dispositions and disposition equivalents. For California Workers
Comp., case receipts are entered in lieu of dispositions.
(c) Much of the large differences between Social Security and other
systems relate to abandonment and settlement rates which are substantially higher
in other systems than experienced in SSA Hearings and Appeals
The author is convinced that SSA cases are accompanied by decisional
requirements, case development burdens, pre-hearing default/resolution rates and
bulky evidentiary records which factors make it difficult, if not impossible, for SSA
to match some of the higher equivalency rates shown in the above chart.
43 This is
so even conceding a much larger support staff ratio to assist SSA judges than any of
the other adjudication programs (most ratios are at 2-1 or less and none above 3-1,
compared to SSA's 4.5-1 ratio). Nevertheless, the figures tend to demonstrate that
"igh volume" adjudication systems approach "high volume" initial claims processor
output rather readily, somewhat belying the notion that "due process" adjudication
need necessarily be more time consuming than initial level investigation and
decision-making.
Streamlined Decisional Formats and Practices
as Policy and Efficiency Enhancers.
43Indeed, U.S. District Court affirmation rates for ALJ decisions showed
dramatic increases as SSA's judges "hurried up" to produce record numbers of decisions
both in the aggregate and "per Judge", i.e., from 61% in 1986 to 78% in 1991 and 86%
in 1994. This was accompanied by a significant reduction in District Court remand rates
of appealed ALJ decisions (from 61% in 1986 to 43% in 1991 and 39% in 1994). OHA,
From the Associate Commissioner's Desk, no. 35, p. 2 (newsletter, April/May 1995) and
no. 32, p.2 (June/July 1994).
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One initiative that emerges as critical for high volume systems struggling
with growing caseloads is streamlining the written decision process. This can and
has been done in a number of ways, but three major "shortcut" directions have
emerged for quicker, stripped down, and yet responsible decision formulation.
Ouse of manually-prepared form decisions with standard text, boxes or
lines for checkoff of findings and conclusions, and space for brief insertion of
rationale or special findings and conclusions."
*use of decision macros (i.e., stored software configurations that contain
the basic elements and parts of a decision, often with standard "boilerplate" clauses
and always with provision for inserting individualized case and party identification
data as well as decision maker-tailored statements of rationale and findings as
needed). These macros serve, in effect, as computer-generated decision forms.
Odictation of decisions from the "bench" at the conclusion of the hearing
or as a "same day issuance" of the adjudicator's final determination
Written forms and dictation of decisions are, in concept, ideal "bench
decision" techniques for moving high-volume disputes to conclusion. The Maryland
Office of Administrative Hearings has an excellent variety of forms for use in its
high-volume adjudication and the DOJ Immigration Corps has elevated dictated
decision practices to the most advanced use of that "art" in the nation. In each case,
well over 90 percent of all decisions emanating from those systems are issued as
form decisions or dictated bench decisions. Immigration judge decisions are not
44Case law has made it clear that SSA's statutory duty under the SocialSecurity Act [42 U.S.C. §423(dX5)(B)] to develop a complete medical history and
obtain all evidence necessary to make proper determinations in disability benefit proceedings
applies to ALJ's at the hearing level, thereby mandating evidentiary development duties forSSA judges not normally required ofjudicial officers. See Hill v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 972,974 (10th cir. 1991); Diablo v. Secretary, 627 F. 2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Cullison v.Califano, 613 F. 2d 55 (4th Cir. 1980); Gold v. Secretary, 463 F. 2d 38,43 (2d Cir. 1972);Dozier v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 274,276 (8th Cir. 1985).
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even transcribed as a matter of course. The dictated product is added to the
audiotape which is used to record the hearing and is transcribed only if there is an
appeal. Justice Department regulations prescribe the issuance of a short written
order to the parties in order to implement the dictated decision and certify its
conclusions.
45
Form decisions require careful drafting, as most adjudicative agencies
which seek optimal benefits and economy by using them soon learn. Cases in which
one can characterize the universe of findings and rationales fairly simply are prime
candidates for form decision treatment, especially where it is possible to articulate
in the form virtually everything needed for a final trial decision short of a few simple
fill-ins and check-offs. The British system uses what is essentially a written form
decision, but reserves sections for insertion of key evidentiary findings, conclusions
of law and the ultimate decision rather than a full panoply of checkoff alternatives. 6
The Impact of Court Review on High Volume Operations.
All administrative tribunals are subject to some form of court review and
the expectation of appellate correction and guidance, sometimes in the form of
significant precedential decisions interpreting statutes and regulations in ways not
previously recognized or adhered to by the agency and its adjudicators, was present
in all systems reviewed. It was only in two systems, however, that the volume and
intensity of court review seemed to exert a substantial impact not only on legal and
4' 8 CFR §3.37 (where decisions are rendered orally a memorandum
summarizing the oral decision shall be served on the parties). The required memorandum
is essentially a form with space for checkoff of all possible outcomes in
deportation/exclusion/rescission proceedings and an "other" item for special dispositions.
For advice, procedural requisites, and legal implications of oral decision use in federal APA
adjudication, see Mullins, Manual forAdministrative Law Judges, pp. 100-101 (ACUS, 3d.
ed., 1993Xoral decisions recommended for cases involving few parties, limited issues and
short hearings).
' See Form AT3 of the British Independent Tribunal Service which constitutes
a "record of proceedings" before an ITS 3-member appeal tribunal and leaves room for
entry of findings on questions of material fact, text of the tribunal decision, and reasons for
the decision (space of no more than 1/3 to 1/2 page for such components).
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procedural doctrine-but on hearing operation management and productivity as well
These were the SSA and Board of Veterans' Appeals adjudication operations
Additionally, ALJ decisions from at least half of the hearing systems were subjec
to appellate review functioning right within the agency (or very close to it) as
stepping stone and filter for cases ultimately destined for federal or state cour
appeal.
4 7
In several of the tribunals, the ir.zidence of court appeals is quite small
Thus, the New York "fair hearings" operation yields about 500 court appeals a yea
from its 160,000 annual case receipts. The British Independent Tribunals system
with 200,000 social insurance hearing requests, winds up with about 2,500 goin
on for Insurance Commissioner review and then less than a hundred to the Court
of Appeal. The Department of Justice's Imnigration Corps, now approachin
200,000 annual case receipts, will have only about 1,000 appeals moving beyon(
its internal appeals operation (Board of Immigration Appeals) to the federal courts
Perhaps 600-650 workers compensation decisions per year are appealed to th
California courts following adjudication by a WC Judge and a second look by thi
system' s Workers Compensation Appeal Board.
The SSA program, in contrast, generates 10,000 to 12,000 court appeal:
a year, even after appellate review and narrowing by SSA's Appeals Council (whicl
handles claimant appeals of roughly 60,000 to 70,000 adverse AJ decisions eacl
year).' Also, the Board of Veterans' Appeals, with the advent ofjudicial review ii
1991 by, first, the new Article I Court of Veterans' Appeals (COVA) and, then, tht
'This includes the Appeals Council for SSA administrative law judge decisions
the Insurance Commissioners for British social security adjudicators, the Board of Reviev
for Illinois unemployment insurance judge referees, and the Appeals Board for Califomi,
decisions of workers compensation judges. See relevant profiles, at Appendix A, infra.
OSSA, Key Workload Indicators, Fy 1944, "Appeals Council Review Workloads"
chart at p. 11 ( Dec. 1994Xshowing appeal receipts of 62,674, 70,742, and 76,18'
respectively in fy 1994 and 1995) and "New Court Case Workloads", chart at p. iH
(showing 8,071, 10,991, and 10,504 court filings, respectively, in fy 1992, 1993 and 1994)
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, has experienced a rather substantial
number of appeals from its decisions (about 10 percent). 49 Although not large in
absolute size (totaling perhaps 1,300 cases), the COVA appeals produced such a
heavy remand rate (close to 50 percent) as to seriously backlog BVA operations and
extend average decision time to what is probably the slowest in government for a
high-volume administrative tribunal. A similar impact has, for at least the past
decade and probably longer, been experienced with SSA appeals where federal
court reversals and remands to the appeals council have consistently run at a rate
above or close to 50 percent. These kinds of high "case return" rates, not evident in
other systems, have tended to slow down hearing operations, require more intensive
and detailed decision issuances and, thereby, impose an administrative burden
beyond normal judicial review dimensions.
Case Settlement and Fall-Off Experience in High-Volume Operations,
It is tempting to say that high-volume operation necessarily must find ways
of disposing of a large percentage of caseload without investment of hearing time
and expense. This, of course, is a truism that applies to civil trial courts in general.
Looking at the federal example, it has long been the case that less than five percent
of civil lawsuits filed in U.S. District Courts actually reach trial (the vast majority
being settled or otherwise terminated even before commencement of pretrial
activities).5"
49BVA, Report of the Chairman: FY 1944 (showing over 750 days response
time for decisions in Fy 1994 and estimating a comparable rate in Fy 1995 compared
with 139 days in Fy 1991 and 240 days in Fy 1992). Examples of appellate court decisions
contributing to this slowdown, as cited in the report, were Schafrath v. Derwinski, I Vet.
App. 589 (1991)(Board must consider every potentially applicable regulation in its decision
regardless of whether it was raised by the appellant or considered in the field); Boyer v,
Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 53 (1991Xin reconsideration of prior BVA decisions, Board must
entirely readjudicate the case on a de novo basis); and McGinnis v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 239
(1993Xrequiring Board to be more technical and "legalistic" in decision writing).
'* See, e.g., Table C-4, Civil Cases Terminated during Twelve Months ending
Sept. 30, 1994, Report of Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (1995)
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Indeed, whether or not driven by necessity, a heavy proportion of case
resolutions without recourse to formal hearing has been a way of life for most of the
tribunals reviewed Within the DOJ Immigration Corps, only about half of the cases
come to full hearing (most being resolved at "master calendar" review, often by
stipulated agreement or non-appearance of appealing parties). At the Board of
Veterans' Appeals, much the same result is achieved through an active pre-Board
field reconsideration/negotiationhinformal hearing process. Even Board disposition
by decision is, through extensive hearing waivers, arrived at by on-the-record
analysis and amplification without hearing (about 90 percent of BVA decision
issuances). In the British ITS tribunals, hearings are avoided about a third of the
time and that, by and large, is the experience under the present U.S. Social Security
adjudication program (as well as under SSA reengineering plans for new
pre-hearing resolution techniques and procedures). 1
Defaults, abandonments and "no shows" keep the New York fair hearings
operation at a 50 percent "termination by decision " level, and the California
Workers Compensation program subsists on one of the lowest hearing rates found
(about 25 percent of case filings), primarily through an extensive "compromise and
release" agreement approach to resolution of worker/insurer differences in cases for
which hearing applications have been filed. That leaves Social Security, British ITS
and the Maryland Central Panel system on the high side of hearing incidence (about
two-thirds of filings). Illinois occupies first place, with the highest rate of hearings
conducted and completed (probably 90 percent or better once appeals are received
from field offices).52
5 See relevant profiles, Appendix A. SSA's Reengineering Plan assumes
allowance of benefits in 25% of ALJ appeals prior to hearing (and 4% of denials beforethat as a result of reconsideration and claimant interviews when initial examinationdecision suggests denial of benefits), Plan for a New Disability Claim Process, supra n.
7 at pp. 65-67.
"Interview with V. Napolitano, Acting Mgr. Dept. Of Employment Security
Appeals Div., Nov. 28, 1995.
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It is difficult to identify patterns or formulate generalizations out of the
foregoing, since high-volume systems exhibit varying characteristics that account for
hearing avoidance in greater or lesser degree and significantly influence the
character of a system's hearing avoidance mechanisms and incentives. Formal
structured settlement programs ( such as those in the Immigration Corps, Maryland
Central Panel, and some other programs) have proved helpful. 3 However, these do
not presently seem to carry dominant weight or responsibility in accounting for the
large case fall-offs prior to actual hearing stages seen in some systems. Nevertheless,
many high-volume systems are constantly in search of and experimenting with
settlement programs in different ways. For example, half of the larger "fair hearing
systems" make some use of "final settlement efforts based on contact with appellants
by state or local staff' or "structured efforts to settle cases of state/local error which
the appellant is likely to win".54
Quality Assurance Functions
A classic and traditional hallmark of decision quality has been (and
remains) appellate review. However, for high-volume operations and with the
limited feedback that appellate scrutiny provides on some facets of administrative
adjudication quality and competency, that measure may not be enough to meet a
system's demands for reasonable uniformity of interpretation, articulation of decision
rationales, continuing "course correction" and diligent attention to pressing
workloads.
Within the adjudication systems under review and apart from court appeals,
"outside" quality assurance (i.e., conducted by agency units other than the
"See, e.g., Maryland OAH settlement conference program (initially applied
to personnel cases and now extended to other kinds of hearings) with settlement rates
exceeding 50%. 1994 Annual Report, supra n. 20 at pp. 8-9; e. U.S Merit Systems
Protection Board, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1994 at pp. 12-13 for pilot settlement
programs (one using special settlement judges and the other involving evaluation of
of settlement methods in the adjudicatory process).
4 See California Nationwide Survey, supra n. 40 at Table 2.4, p. 9 .
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adjudication component itself) is a rarity. Yet, a variety of methods of quality
tracking and oversight exist. For example:
*Two systems require a senior adjudicator review of all (or virtually all)
decisions before they are issued. This is not a formal sign off, but a second
examination under which the senior individual (a supervisory judge in the NYOAH
and a senior specialist judge in MOAH), upon detecting errors or significant
omissions, will consult with the trial judge and seek to induce reconsideration and
adjustment. Outright "vetoes" under this in-line quality review step are virtually
non-existent since considerable tolerance and deference is accorded the hearing
judges, the educational value of the procedure is achieved regardless of outcome,
and hearing judges are generally amenable to expert guidance." (It should be noted
that these systems do not incorporate an appellate tribunal like OHA, the
Immigration Corps or California's WCAB).
*The existence of an agency appellate tribunal with some precedential
influence (Board of Immigration Appeals, Illinois Board of Review, California WC
Appeals Board) is considered in the relevant systems to be a significant "quality
assurance" force and typically involves something beyond the communication of a
decision or case remand to the relevant hearing judge (e.g. selective publication of
decisions and incorporation of appellate precedent in training programs for
agency-wide utilization). 6
OReview and evaluation of judge performance is another method of
" For a good picture of the positive and varied kinds of assistance that can
be provided by well-directed internal quality unit probing and support, see the section
on "Quality Assurance", 1995 Annual Report, Office of Administrative Hearings, p.10
(MOAH, Jan. 1996).
" Decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals have been published in hard
bound volumes as "Administrative Decisions under the Immigration and Nationality
Laws" going back to 1940 and distributed widely both within and outside the Dept. of
Justice. They are designated as precedent decisions by majority vote of the Board and
there are now over 3,000 of these extant.
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"quality control" capable of encompassing substance, efficiency and timeliness of
work Among federal tribunals, the Board of Veterans' Appeals, in 1994 legislation,
was directed to implement a performance evaluation system for judges to serve as
the basis for a mandated recertification for duty at least once every three years. 7 On
the state side, in the Maryland central panel system, a plan for evaluating
adjudicative performance of ALJs was put into effect in 1995. This includes review
of randomly selected hearing tapes, a scored evaluation of randomly selected written
decisions, and an executive staff written assessment of each AL's overall
performance in which "timeliness statistics have been made an important factor in
evaluation ofjudicial performance." "
*lf one accepts that timeliness is at least a proper partial measure of the
quality of ajudge's work, then half the agencies reviewed had the additional prod of
a legislative mandate to be "productive". This refers to the federally imposed
durational limits of the adjudicative process for hearing and decision issuance for
AFDC, Food Stamp, and Medicaid cases (i.e., within 90 days of filing an appeal)
and for Unemployment Compensation appeals (within 75 days of filing the appeal),
all on pain of loss of federal allocations and all applied as an overall percentage
norm rather than a rigid case requirement.59 Even the federal Immigration Corps
finds itself tied to statutory decisional limits (effectively 105-180 days from filing to
disposition) in the handling of certain asylum applications.'
OSSA has recently introduced a quality assurance system for ALJ
adjudication featuring "peer review" by a revolving corps of volunteer ALJs who
examine decisions that have become administratively final (i.e., will not be altered
even though evaluation suggests errors in outcome). This has been ongoing for
" Cf. n. 38, supra.
5 See MOAH, 1994 Annual Report, supra n. 19 at p. 8.
59See discussion under "Pressures and Presence of Time Limits", supra.
"See n. 39, supra.
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almost three years and is based upon carefully developed and statistically measurable
review protocols. The system was developed and is administered by SSA's Office
of Program and Integrity Reviews. It has involved close to 100 ALJs within the SSA
Office of Hearings and Appeals, and has led to interesting findings on common
errors, needs for training, lack of policy clarity that tends to produce inconsistent
results, weak spots in evidentiary evaluation, etc.6"
It is difficult to see how high-volume operations can or should ignore
experimentation with appropriate quality assurance techniques in the effort to
provide agency litigants with accurate and knowledgeable decision work. This is
particularly true in systems in which few decisions will be scrutinized by higher
appellate tribunals or where large numbers of certain kinds of decisions will rarely
come before appellate or other oversight bodies. It is important, of course, that the
techniques and formats used are structured to enlighten, enhance and improve
performance rather than chill the independence ofjudicial inquiry and judgment so
important in any adjudicative forum.
It should be clear to the reader that this review only scratches the surface
of issues, concepts, and solutions associated with the challenge of high-volume
adjudication in this nation. Transferability of operational techniques, organizational
arrangements, management controls, and procedural innovations to bolster quality
and responsiveness call for closer examination and access to more detail than has
been attempted in or permitted by this exploration. Nevertheless, in studying such
topics as the place of adjudication operations within given agency structures, the
geographic organization of services, reporting channels and authorities for
"
1See SSA Office of Program Integrity and Reviews, Findings of the Disability
Hearings Quality Review Process Peer Review: An Assessment of ALJ Decision making
and Responsibilities, including the Procedural Conduct of the Hearing, the Questioning
of Witnesses, and Other Legal Obligations (Mar. 1995).
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adjudication units, time and caseload pressures confronting administrative tribunals,
kinds of streamlining initiatives, court review impacts, case settlement and default
experience, and quality assurance programs, it is hoped that the observations offered
will serve as both a motivator and stimulus to further dialogue and inquiry.
Before concluding, some disclaimers may be in order to avoid unintended
impressions. The focus on large case numbers, "short causes" and quick
adjudicative services was in no sense meant to suggest that low levels of importance,
case complexity, or adjudicative judgment were inherent in high- volume workloads.
Social security disability benefits cases, for example, are in no sense "small claim"
or "small potatoes" matters. They involve precious rights of entitlement to
subsistence or income replacement for individuals with little access and few
alternatives to other soumces of support for basic living needs. Indeed, benefit values
at issue in such cases have been estimated at $90,000 for disabled worker awards
(all elements, including derivative claimant shares). 62 Similarly, it would be hard to
place a price on the value of the right to legal residence in the United States for an
individual subject to a deportation or exclusion action before an Immigration Court.
Comparable cases could be made for the importance and high value of adjudicative
outcomes in virtually every other system examined in these pages.
Conversely, preoccupation with "high volume" as a dimension of
administrative adjudication worthy of an intense inward look was not calculated to
dismiss or denigrate or slight the critical importance of complex "low volume"
adjudication (if that kind of a descriptor can be used) to our nation's economy, safety
and well being. A few years back, the author had occasion to reference some
observations about the vital role of ALJs in this arena, noting that "their impact upon
the regulated industry and economy in general, the number of parties involved, and
their general size and complexity, are comparable to some of the biggest and most
62See memo, SSA Chief Actuary on "Average Value of Disability Awards"
(Feb. 7,1994).
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complex cases tried in the federal courts."63 This was clearly meant to encompass,
indeed extol, the great regulatory tribunals of modest size that placed an indelible
stamp of service, excellence and "complexity conquered" on America's
administrative adjudication process. It would be naive not to recognize that a small
iribunal handling a small number of critical cases could offer as much "justice" and
social impact as those examined in this article. All are precious and important to the
nation's "day in court" ideals and all merit scholarly time and attention. This article's
brief for a bit of "isolation" and "dissection" on high-volume operations will, it is
hoped, be understood and challenge more of the same by adjudication agencies and
commentators at all levels of government.
APENDIX A
IMMIGRATION JUDGE CORPS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
The Immigration Judge Hearing Operation. The Immigration Judge Corps is now disposing
(they call these "completions") of some 181,000 cases a year with 165 sitting judges (as of
October 1995) operating out of 34 "Immigration Courts" (the regulatory title of their hearing
offices). That is an average of about 1,100 cases per judge per year. This would suggest an
annual Immigration Corps productivity rate of over 1 million case dispositions per year if they
had receipts of that order and as many judges as OHA's 1,050 ALJ average in Fy 1995. The
Immigration Corps and its caseload is growing at almost as rapid a rate as that of OHA. In Fy
1996, they expect to have well over 200,000 receipts and about 200 judges. This places them
second in size and status only to SSA in terms of case volume adjudication among the nation's
administrative adjudication systems. The staff to judge ratio is about 2 to 1. Total staff
inclusive of judges is approximately 500.
The Immigration Judge Corps (excluding three ALJ's handling employment
discrimination and illegal employment cases) adjudicates primarily three types of cases: (i)
deportation of aliens in the country, (ii) exclusion of aliens apprehended or detained at the
borders at time of entry, and (iii) bond hearings for aliens under cloud of deportation. These
amount to well over 90% of the cases received and heard, with deportation hearings
constituting the bulk of the workload (about 75%). The latter average 2-3 hours per full
63J. Zwerdling, The Role and Functions of Federal Hearing Examiners (1972),
quoted in Skoler, The Changing Role of Administrative Law Judges: Time to Shift
Gears, 22 The Judges Journal 25,26 (Fall 1983).
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"merits" hearings (much shorter for bond hearings). There are also weekly "master calendar"
hearings where judges do scheduling and pretrial on about 25 new cases plus 10 to 15
"resets" (from prior "master calendars") per session. About 50% of the cases filed go to a full
hearing. The rest are resolved at the "master calendar" stage (often by stipulated agreement
of the parties or by statutorily authorized "in absentia" hearings when the alien fails to appear).
Some 16,000 cases are appealed annually to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA). Decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, if so designated, are deemed
precedential nationwide and binding on INS in adjudication of the immigration laws. (A U.S.
circuit court decision which overturns a BIA decision is accepted by DOJ as precedent only
within that circuit). The Immigration Judges, the BIA, and the ALJs referenced above are all
part of the Executive Office for Immigration review (EOIR). EOIR is a component of the
Department of Justice separate from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) which
makes the initial deportation and exclusion determinations that are subject to Immigration
Judge appeal. Perhaps a 1,000 of the cases appealed to both the Immigration Corps and BIA
go on to the federal courts as further appeals, i.e., deportation cases directly to a Circuit Court
and exclusion cases to the District Courts. All proceedings are adversary in nature, involve
100% representation of the government ( i.e., the INS which is the charging party in
adjudication proceedings) and about 40% representation of the aliens subject to adjudication
proceedings.
Immigration judges "write" over 95% of their decisions (actually they dictate these
into the hearing tape record and they are literally called "oral decisions"). This is done the day
of the hearing, typically after the hearing closes following a few minutes of deliberation to
order the judge's thoughts and notes. Decisions are generally not transcribed until needed for
an appeal. There is only about one "law clerk" per 7 judges. These staff attorneys not to
serve more than one or two years, being hired at the Department of Justice "honors program"
level for new attorneys, i.e., grade GS-1 I and rising to GS- 12 during their short tenure. They
are assigned the writing of some of the more complex decisions and also any special legal
research or analysis required by the judges.
immigration judges handle civil enforcement disputes (which have a quasi-criminal
flavor because of the detention and removal issues involved) rather than benefit claims. These
are initiated by the Government (DOJ's Immigration and Naturalization Service, "INS")
rather than claimants and thus a rather strict separation is maintained from INS by the judge
corps. This does not, however, seem to create the policy and interpretative differences said
to be involved in administration of the SSA disability process at DDS and ALJ levels.
Management and Organizational Structure. The Chief Judge is the national manager of the
adjudication operation. He reports to the Director of the Executive Office of Immigration
Review (EOIR) who in turn reports to the Deputy Attorney General. Virtually all
administrative services are provided by EOIR.
There is no regional office structure. Instead, there are 8 assistant chief judges all
housed in the Washington area who are assigned geographic oversight responsibility and who
can come together on almost a daily basis, if necessary, to work out problems and positions
of uniformity, production, delay and accountability in administration of the program. Also,
there are no chiefjudges in the 34 immigration courts (hearing offices)-only rotating "liaison"
judges who handle certain communication and information distribution tasks but do not
function as managers. In short, all judges in the field are line judges. Managerial
responsibilities are in the hands of the assistant chief judges in the Washington area who ride
circuit and, in addition to management tasks, continue to hear some cases to keep in touch
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with the field.
Each field office ("court") has a court administrator who basically manages the
hearing office. This position is graded at GS-13 level but will soon be replaced by a banding
system that will expand the range from GS-9 entry up to GS-14 (and, for the few largest
courts, perhaps Grade GS-1 5). These administrators very frequently have master's degrees(if originally hired primarily on the basis of academic credentials) or have had extensive prior
court management experience.
The Chief Judge is in charge of local procedural rules for adjudication of
immigration cases. Each "court" may have its own local rules but they must be signed off by
the Chief Judge. National rules of procedure are maintained through regulations prepared by
the EOIR and issued by the Attorney General. The Chief Judge also has his own series of
operational policies (somewhat like SSA's HALLEX but less integrated).
BOARD OF VETERANS' APPEALS,
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
The Board of Veterans' Appeals Operation. The Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) acts
on about 3.3. million benefit claims a year in non-education matters (most of which involve
or relate to disability). This activity generated some 65,000 appeals last year from
disappointed veteran and derivative claimants (widows, dependent children, guardians, etc.)
which, in the DVA system, are initiated by "notices of disagreement" followed by a
responding DVA "statement of the case." The "notices of disagreement' can be (and often
are) resolved by hearing officers in the field attached to the 58 DVA regional offices that
originally consider claims and also by other field officials authorized to resolve claims.
Through this "reconsideration" and field hearing/readjudication process (including new
evidence, additional claimant argumentation, withdrawals and abandonments), resolutions are
reached which substantially reduce the appeals receipts of the Board of Veterans' Appeals
(OHA's counterpart at DVA), e.g., down to about 38,000 cases for de novo review in Fy
1995 (inclusive of appeals of previously remanded cases).
The Board (BVA) now has about 55 adjudicators (with five more in process of
recruitment) who operate as solo judges. The Board used to sit in panels of three or more but
that was changed by recent legislation (1994). The total personnel complement of the BVA
operation is about 450 workers, inclusive of 55 judges, 200 attorneys (who operate as decision
writers and legal assistants to the members), 10 miscellaneous attorney support personnel and
about 190 administrative support personnel.
Board decisions deal with disputes about agency findings of service-connected
injury or disease (is it service related?) and the extent of compensable disability(determinations of 100%, 90%, 80%, etc., disability by "rating boards'). Pension claims
based on disability also involve issues of employability. It should be further noted that only
a minority of appellants actually seek hearings before BVA (about 10%) and when held,
hearings typically run about 45 minutes (although there can be great variations). Hearings are
simply not a predominant part of BVA adjudication operations or a major contributor to the
system's case complexity. Most cases are disposed of only by file amplification, analysis, and
issuance of written decisions. With or without hearings, these can involve extended work and
study (with full statements of facts, applicable law, reasoning, conclusions, and the decision
itself). While there is a right to hearing in every case, appellants do not choose to request a
hearing in most cases. Claimant representation is high (about 90%), mostly supplied by
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veterans' service organizations and a small portion coming from privately retained counsel
(about 3%).
Case dispositions were about 28,000 in Fy 1995, somewhat below the 38,000
intake. Waiting time from docketing of an appeal to decision issuance is now running over
two years (760 days in Fy 1995). In decisional outcome, BVA allowance/denial rates are quite
close to OHA's experience if one counts remands (BVA has broad remand authority and uses
it liberally to return cases to the field, about 25% of which are disposed of favorable or
partially favorable after further "working"). Thus, the BVA allowance/remand rate of 67%
in Fy 1995 was very close to OHA's allowance rate of 67% (and was accompanied by
comparable case dismissal and denial rates as well). The big contrast was in the use of
remands when BVA found fault with field determinations that were appealed (i.e., 2/3
remand, 1/3 allowance).
There is a right of appeal from BVA decisions to the recently established (1992)
Court of Veterans' Appeals (COVA). In contrast to the approximately 28,000 BVA appeal
decisions made in Fy 1995, around 1300 (almost 5%) were appealed to COVA which, like our
Appeals Council, has a low direct reversal rate. Perhaps 1% of appeals to COVA are reversed
with nearly half of the remainder being affirmed and the other half remanded. COVA has an
"error of law" and "clearly erroneous" standard of review (the latter meaning that the court
will only reverse on the facts when the agency findings and application of law were clearly
wrong). COVA's remand rate has usually reflected a tough stance on procedural and
documentation error which is expected to abate as (i) the Board becomes familiar with the
court's requirements and learns to document and justify its decisions per COVA standards and
(ii) COVA standards themselves stabilize and exhibit less change and flux than initially
experienced. There is a further right of appeal from COVA to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (limited to questions of Law) and then on to the discretionary jurisdiction of
the U.S. Supreme Court.
Management and Organizational Structure. The chief executive officer of the BVA
adjudication operation is the presidentially-appointed Chairman of the Board of Veterans'
Appeals. There is a Vice Chairman who serves as the Board's chief operating officer. The
Chairman reports directly to the Office of the DVA Secretary and the Board's budget is a
separate component within the Department's General Operating Expenses appropriation.
BVA has a Director of Management and Administration who is subject to the Chairman's
oversight (much in the manner of a court administrator's relationship to a chiefjudge).
There are no BVA regional offices or regional chief judges in this operation but
there are 5 Deputy Vice Chairmen (deputy chief judges), four of whom are accountable for
the work and production of decision teams of Board members assigned geographically to
groups of DVA regional offices and also reflecting some substantive specialization
responsibilities where special expertise is desirable and deemed efficient. (In these situations,
the team scope goes beyond assigned geographic regions to other cases involving their
specialty areas). The 5th Deputy Vice Chairman is responsible for training, liaison,
rulemaking and COVA appeal matters. Hearings are frequently held in Washington but
recently Board members have gone into the field to conduct most hearings.
The Board budget was S28.6 million in Fy 1995 and will likely exceed $30 million
in Fy 1996. The budget is prepared internally and defended before the Assistant Secretary for
Finance. BVA is subject to the normal budgetary controls and follows general personnel and
recruitment practices and rules of the department. Judicial selections, i.e., Board Member
appointments, are made by the Secretary with the approval of the President. Candidates are
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interviewed, screened and recommended to the Secretary by the BVA Chair. The Board
makes no policy but does produce its own rules of practice and views the judging mission as
requiring interpretations of law and regulations on issues not directly answered in existing
policy.
Recently, in response to (and apparently as a quid pro quo for) pay increases to
Board members up to APAjudge levels, there was legislatively imposed a peer review system
under which the quality and sufficiency of BVA judge performance is to be reviewed by
panels of 3 Board members no less frequently than every three years. (This has just been
implemented on an annual basis by the Chairman).
BVA, as part of its Department's emergence as a new cabinet agency, recently was
placed under the jurisdiction of a specialized Article I (executive branch) reviewing court
(COVA). This is not dissimilar to at least some versions of the "disability court" proposal that
some officials have been suggesting for serious consideration in SSA's quest for greater
doctrinal consistency in the disability process. The initial results were an unanticipated
slowdown of BVA operations (due to very high remand rates) rather than the interpretive and
policy uniformity that SSA would hope for through such a mechanism, although the latter is
certainly being pursued by the Court of Veterans' Appeals and should ultimately make just
that kind of a contribution to the BVA system.
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, NEW YORK DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES
The New York Hearings O2eration. The New York Office of Administrative
Hearings (NYOAH) has a predominant workload of federal/state entitlement program "fair
hearings" (Medicaid, AFDC and Food Stamps are the high volume items). Most of its cases
(about 80%) originate in the New York City area and the remainder are generated upstate.
In 1995, it received roughly 160,000 requests for hearings and NYOAH estimates a load of
190,000 receipts in 1996. A very large proportion of its requests (46%) result in defaults,
typically abandonments and "no-shows." Thus SSA's adjudicative dispositions run between
80,000-90,000 decisions a year, again predominantly involving the federal entitlement claims
previously mentioned.
NYOAH's current backlog (it calls these "unscheduled hearings" since hearings
docketed in its central scheduling system are invariably held within a week or two of
assignment) is about 25,000 hearings. That is roughly a 3-4 month "waiting time" equivalent.
It should be noted that OAH schedules about 200,000 hearings a year (inclusive of defaults
and continuances) and its hearings average 20-30 minutes in duration. Decisions are
produced through an extensive and automated drafting and mailing process, all operate from
headquarters in Albany for the whole state.
The New York program operates with about 100 attorney adjudicators (they are just
beginning to be called "ALJs"), inclusive of supervisors who generally review and sign off on
decisions before issuance. The total complement of the office is roughly 240 positions
(counting part time workers who, together equate to about 2 dozen FTE slots). Worker
overtime seems, as with SSA's Office of Hearings and Appeals, to have been persistent and
common in recent years.
Representation rates are low (about 5% for claimants or beneficiaries and 90% by
agency representatives, the latter emanating from county government which is responsible in
this state for providing benefits of the kinds mentioned). In addition to federal/state
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entitlements, the office has a modest caseload of adult home licensing, provider fraud, home
relief for non-AFDC claimants (fairly large in volume), energy assistance, and foster and child
care-related claims, benefit terminations, disqualifications, etc.
Appeals beyond NYOAH are relatively few. There is an internal reconsideration
process where a supervisory attorney will review a case disposition on written request
(occurrence rate is a little over 1%) and provision for a state court appeal (occurrence rate is
about 1/2%) which yields about 500 court appeals a year and which the department tends to
settle out. The test in these court appeals involves a legal error and substantial evidence
standard. On reversals from NYOAH adjudication, the upstate rate is about 50%. In NYC,
claimants win benefits almost 90% of the time in cases going to hearing. This is'principally
because the city cannot readily handle appeals or provide documentary evidence substantiating
its position (an unfortunate situation but one balanced by the very high rate of claimant
defaults in hearing requests).
Management and Organizational Structure. The chief executive of the New York
operation has deputy general counsel status within the State Department of Social Services.
NYOAH is organizationally located in the Office of General Counsel but has completely
separate quarters and operates pretty much as a self contained and independent unit. Its chief
executive reports to the General Counsel who in return reports to the Commissioner of Social
Services (a cabinet member and thus the state level equivalent of federal department and
independent agency heads). It has a limited regional setup (Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse,
Long Island and New York City sites) but these are simply offices for its adjudicators rather
than hearing offices since OAH holds hearings in county facilities or, downstate, at a few New
York City hearing sites.
Virtually all administrative support is run out of the Albany headquarters (including
case intake) and thus very few support personnel in New York City are located with
adjudicators except for some 50 staff who do some forms of administrative disposition, a great
deal of local case intake, and are generally viewed as a branch of the Albany headquarters
rather than field office workers. The NYOAH has no discrete budget (being part of the
General Counsel budget) but its allocation was about $8.5 million for the past year. Budgets
are formulated by the General Counsel budget officer with NYOAH input and then approved
by the commissioner of Social Services (and ultimately the legislature)
New York has by far the largest state/federal entitlement program caseload in the
nation. It is also a large state geographically and yet has achieved an impressive and efficient
degree of centralization in (i) docket control and assignment and (ii) automated decision
formulation and transmission that bears study by other adjudication systems engaged in
"reinvention" studies or seeking to streamline regional hierarchies.
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MARYLAND OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
The Maryland Central Panel Operation. The Maryland Office of Administrative
Hearings (MOAH) is a state level counterpart of the independent ALJ Corps contemplated by
proposed federal legislation such as H.R. 1802 and S. 486 (the Reorganization of the Federal
Administrative Judiciary Act). It was established by statute in 1989, came into existence on
January 1, 1990 and now has five full years of operating experience hearing cases on behalf
of more than twenty state agencies for over 200 different programs.
MOAH is, somewhat surprisingly in view of Maryland's modest population, one
of the largest of the two dozen state central panel corps now in existence (there are more than
20). It has 64 judges (including the chief ALJ and a few part time judges) handling an
expected 60,000 case receipts in fiscal 1996 (which began for the state last July-there were
50,000 receipts in 1995 and over 44,000 cases concluded. This case volume exceeds that of
much more populous "central panel" states such as Florida, California, and Michigan,
probably because MOAH has adjudicative jurisdiction of Motor Vehicle Administration
appeals which accounts for perhaps 60% of its case receipts (mostly license revocations and
restrictions). The next two largest case categories are "health and mental hygiene" and
"human resources" appeals, which are dominated in volume by AFDC, Medicaid and Food
Stamp cases (the major federal/state entitlement programs). Together, these will likely yield
over 20,000 requests for hearings in Fy 1966.
The Maryland program has a heavy fall-off in abandonments and "no shows"
(almost 50% for entitlement cases). Another 15% are settled by the parties and this is
reflected in withdrawal and remand rates. The remaining 35% become contested hearings.
Hearings vary in length with the kind of dispute involved, i.e., rough averages of 1/2 hour for
motor vehicle and federal entitlement cases, l& 1/2 hours for mental health commitment, and
a half day for personnel disputes. Further appeals exist to the state circuit court (30 day filing
deadline). MOAH, even with steady annual growth in new state programs which it is
authorized to adjudicate, is just about current in disposing of incoming receipts each year and
has little backlog buildup.
Within MOAH, there are specialist judges who sign off on cases before issuance
by the hearing judge (a kind of pre-effectuation quality review) and provide training and
guidance to fellow ALJ's in their specialty areas. This practice of review of virtually every
decision by a "subject matter expert" has been criticized by some APA authorities. It is a form
of in-line quality review and the agency supports that effort with an aggressive and continuing
training and decisional aids program. Bench decisions on printed forms are commonplace for
MOAH's high volume case categories and skeletons of various decision types are maintained
in computers and libraries for ALJ guidance. Among its ALJ's, there is no subject matter
specialization. Judges are generalists assigned to all kinds of cases except for the first I to
l&1/2 years of service when they focus on high volume cases.
The Maryland State Administrative Procedure Act imposes a specific 90-day
deadline on issuance of decisions after hearing. In this regard, the agency is proud of its
record of easing backlogs when given jurisdiction of a class of disputes, e.g., reducing prisoner
grievance backlogs from 1500 cases to 100 cases in a short period and cutting down the
appeals process in personnel cases from 2-3 years to less than 6 months. Indeed, MOAH is
very much a central corps handling virtually all the state's administrative adjudication business
via delegated powers of proposed or final decision making authority. (One major exception
is that MOAH does not handle the state's workers compensation adjudication). Neither
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MOAH nor, apparently, the Maryland public perceives significant conflict in dealing with hard
federal and state decisional deadlines
(as indicated, it has both, the former coming from federal "fair hearing" rules in the Medicaid,
AFDC and Food Stamps programs) while maintaining high adjudication standards tailored to
the types of cases and case volumes within its mission responsibilities.
Management and Organizational Structure. The Chief Judge is the top executive
official of MOAH. He is appointed by the Governor, confirmed by the Senate, and reports
directly to the Governor. MOAH itself has the status of an independent agency within the
executive branch of state government. Most of the operation is centrally run with only two
small satellite offices (Salisbury and Cumberland). Judges travel and conduct hearings all
over the state.
Budgets are formulated by the agency, presented to the Department of Budget and
Fiscal Planning, and ultimately reviewed by the Governor for submission to the legislature.
Judges are state employees who follow all rules and regulations on such matters as travel,
compensatory time, overtime, etc., as well as personnel recruitment policies and procedures
general applicable to merit and non-merit system employees in other departments of state
government (ALJ's being in the latter category). All of MOAH's work is subject to due
process and procedural requirements of the state APA and also to previously mentioned time
limits. There is a 3% court appeal rate (700-1000 cases year out of the 30,000 cases heard).
MOAH has its own separate facilities and courtrooms in a Baltimore area building
(and about 40% of its hearings are held there) but will often conduct hearings in other agency
facilities. Administrative services are furnished by MOAH itself out of its separate budget
(equipment, maintenance) or by the State General Services Administration (office space).
DIVISION OF WORKERS COMPENSATION, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Note: Workers Compensation (WC) was the first form of social insurance to develop in the
United States. Indeed, most states were covered two decades before passage of the Social
Security Act 60 years ago. Today, every state has a WC program, there are two federal
programs, and over 90% of the nation's employed work force is covered by some WC system.
Costs of these programs are borne almost exclusively by employers through insurance or self
insurance plans and total outlays are now running above $40 billion per year. The California
system is one of the largest, and despite some variations among the states, exemplifies most
of the basic features of large WC adjudication programs.
The California Workers Compensation Appeals Operation. The California
Workers Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) oversees nearly 180 referee judges in 28
district offices issuing a breathtaking 760,000 "decisions" per year. The WCAB is defined
to include all persons in the adjudication program, including commissioners, deputy
commissioners, presiding referees and referee judges. The Appeals Board itself consists of
seven "commissioners", one of whom is the chairperson. The total personnel complement
for the Boards and their administrative division in the State Department of Industrial Relations
is almost 1,100 employees (more than a third of whom are involved in activities other than
adjudication).
In the California system, a single application or case can yield several "decisions"
which involve such issues as orders for award of attorneys fees, approval of commutation of
awards, stipulations and findings of fact, compensation awards, and compromise and release
agreement approvals. This order of "decision" output is difficult to compare meaningfully
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with that of other systems in the review. A more useful comparative estimate might be the
program's case filings volume of about 220,000 per year (Fy 1994), about 55,000 of which
involve hearings ("trials") at which both sides to the controversy or disagreement are
represented most of the time (over 90%). Among the cases not going to hearing, the most
common disposition is a "compromise and release" agreement submitted for Board approval
and representing a resolution fashioned without adjudication between the major parties, i.e.,
typically the injured or ill worker and either a self-insured employer or an insurance company
representing the employer.
Issues that come before the WCAB revolve around the existence of temporary or
permanent disabilities through injury or occupational disease and compensation for such
disabilities. Cases that cannot be settled between workers and their employers or other
insurers (or settlements when the parties seek Board validation) are opened by either side
submitting an "application" to the Board. A concerted effort to encourage settlement,
including mandatory settlement conferences, was put in high gear by 1989 legislation and has
paid off. This is facilitated by a special corps of nearly 55 "information and assistance"
officers who offer their services, primarily in cases of unrepresented worker claimants.
Decisions or orders of individual judges are appealed by requesting
"reconsideration" from the Appeal Board (this appellate layer before state court appeal exists
in some form in most states) consisting of 7 politically appointed members (plus 3 nonpolitical
deputies who can perform Board reconsideration roles as needed) and a total staff complement
of nearly 40 (including decision writer law clerks). The Appeal Board decides roughly 5,000
appeals a year sitting in panels of 3 commissioners. About 600-650 Appeal Board decisions
are appealed yearly to the California courts through writs of review (Court of Appeals and
then the state's Supreme Court).
Management and Organization Structure. The Workers compensation operation is
located as a Division within the California Department of Industrial Relations. It is the largest
component of that Department which also oversees such activities as labor law administration
and workplace safety. The Division of Workers Compensation is headed by a non-judicial
Administmfive Director who reports to the Department Director and, in turn, is the reporting
authority for the law-trained Assistant Chief of the Division who manages the adjudication
function (somewhat in the manner of a "chiefjudge"). The Division is largely responsible for
administrative support of the Boards (personnel, budget, supplies, communications,
automation, etc.) and in turn calls upon and is accountable to general departmental
management and support entities for a number of administrative functions and approvals.
However, leadership is rather distinctly split into judicial and administrative functions, with
the former, i.e., the Assistant Chief's domain focusing on adjudication policy and procedures,
ethics (under a rather strict standard), and the legal professionals engaged in adjudication.
The WC Division has a modest regional structure (North, Central and Southern
Regions) in which are located 28 district offices which house, together, the referee judges and
other functions and services of the division (essentially a fairly comprehensive co-location
scheme for adjudicators and other field functions). The referees travel frequently to service
remote areas and have 8 fixed travel locations for these purposes. This kind of outreach,
however, involves less than 15% of the cases adjudicated. There is specific provision and
procedures for rehabilitation disputes before they go to referee judges (as opposed to
compensation issues) which arise out of the actions and determinations of the rehabilitation
units of the Division. About 4% of these are appealed.
The adjudication budget is formulated by the Administrative Director of the WC
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Division and is well integrated with other Division cost centers, e.g., rehabilitation units,
information and assistance units, unit enforcement, etc. Budgetary controls mirror those
applicable to all state agencies and, as with other agencies, oversight and sign-off authorization
of the State Departments of Finance and Administration must be obtained. This is coordinated
through specialized budget, personnel and procurement staff in the Division. Thus the parent
agency supplies equipment, office space, repair, maintenance, and automation services etc.
although the Division usually handles needs once contracts are in place.
Policy determination is in the hands of the Administrative Director and the Appeals
Board (the latter vested with ultimate authority to determine rules of practice and procedures
for the WC courts). In their policy efforts, the Appeals Board will hold hearings on proposed
regulations and meet with the various WC constituencies for input ( e.g., attorneys, insurers,
medical providers, rehabilitation organizations, interpreters, and self-insured employers).
For internal guidance of employees, the WC Division and Appeals Board
promulgate a Policy and Procedure Manual. Policy uniformity is a continuing problem and
achieved through oversight of WC judge decisions and the appellate process. Conflicting
interpretations within the Division, for example, frequently arise with respect to rehabilitation
disputes (which are handled on a kind of claims examiner basis and where different
procedures are sometimes followed). There is acceptance of the concept of quality assurance
review of referee judge decisions but not much systematic activity of this kind has yet been
launched. A digest of decisions and occasional targeted dissemination of appellate decisions
is also viewed as a tool for achieving adjudicative consistency.
As indicated, WC judges are located in district offices with other personnel.
However, the only claims officers involved in the California system are those administering
applications under the Uninsured Employer Fund. Other initial claim review and disposition
is in the hands of the WC insurers or self-insured employers. While the adjudicators normally
leave the task of presenting evidence to the parties, they must not close the record until they
have all the evidence necessary to make a decision. In some cases, judges can ask for
independent medical examinations. Although judges are under strict rules of adjudicative
propriety (e.g., ex parte contacts are prohibited), they are not subject to the provisions of the
state administrative procedure act. However, they are subject to the same Code of Judicial
Conduct as other state judges.
The lack of an initial claims review function in the system somewhat limits
comparison and potential application of system features to high volume adjudication programs
in which most appeals come from the determinations of an initial decision maker level of
agency employees (or, as in the case of SSA, from state agency contract workers). In most
WC systems, appeals emanate from interaction and disagreements between workers and
insurers. In essence the whole California WC operation is an adjudicative one, either deciding
appeals or validating settlements coming up from non-agency third parties. Also, the very high
settlement rates reflect an ability to agree and compromise on amount and character of awards
which does not exist as an option in many other high volume programs.
The California structured settlement system results in a higher level of
pre-adjudication dispositions (about 75% of cases submitted as applications for a WC judge
hearing) compared to "on the record" disposition rates, including dismissals and defaults,
under most other programs. Nevertheless, the existence of a sizable corps of facilitators for
pre-appeal resolution (about 25% the size of the referee judge complement) seems to offer
economies and speed for a high volume system.
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APPEALS DIVISION, ILLINOIS
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
Note: The four major areas of "high volume administrative adjudication" at state levels
involve claims and appeals concerning (i) workmen's compensation, (ii) federal state
entitlement benefits (Medicaid, AFDC, Food Stamps), (iii) motor vehicle and driver's license
suspensions and restrictions, and (iv) unemployment compensation benefits and tax disputes.
Some of these may be handled by the same corps of administrative law judges or hearing
officers in a given state. However, it is more likely that separate corps of adjudicators will
handle most of these high volume appeal proceedings. This preview deals with hearings on
employee unemployment benefit claims and related employer tax and chargeability issues.
It involves one of the largest state operations in that field.
The Illinois Employment Security Appeals Operation. The Appeals Division of the
Illinois Department of Employment Security handles roughly 60,000 cases a year, the bulk
of which involve unemployment insurance benefit issues (benefit hearings), either employee
initiated to establish eligibility or employer initiated to contest a charge for benefits allowed
to a worker. A smaller workload (perhaps 3,000-5,000 of the 60,000 receipts) deal with tax
cases (administrative hearings) involving employer liability for unemployment insurance taxes,
calculation of amounts thereof, etc.). There is, in essence no backlog of such cases. By and
large, receipts keep apace with dispositions each year and the appeals operation meets and
betters its federal mandates for disposing of 60% of cases in 30 days and 90% in 45 days.
This work is carried out with 68 judges (called referees or supervising referees) and
a total staff complement of about 100 workers. Cases are received from a network of some
56 local offices distributed around the state (with most in the Chicago metropolitan area).
Very few cases are settled or disposed of on the record once a local office transmits a hearing
request to the Appeals Division. Local offices themselves, on receipt of an appeal, may
reconsider or decide to allow the claimant's contentions but after a case goes to the Division,
it is invariably scheduled for hearing and, except for a small percentage of no-shows and
abandonments, is heard and decided.
"Benefit cases" are scheduled every half hour and generally fall within those
allotted time segments. "Administrative hearings" are somewhat more complicated and
require a few hours on the average. The judge referees write decisions for the great majority
of cases on the same day they are heard (i.e., morning hearings and afternoon decision
writing). As with SSA, there is heavy reliance on macros for decision writing. These are
handled by the judges and there are no separate employee decision writers to discharge or aid
the referee judges in that function.
Employers are often represented, perhaps in 50% of the employer appeals. Rates
are somewhat less for appealing employees. Various tax services supply representatives, and
this source is at least as frequent as the retention of practicing attorneys to represent parties.
As with SSA, the DES referee judges have an affirmative legal obligation to help develop the
claimant's case and case record.
About 20% of cases processed by local offices are appealed and about 90% of these
go to actual hearing. (As indicated, the local offices will settle or change their minds for a
modest number of appeals). Further appeal is possible to a "Board of Review" whose
members are appointed by the Governor and then a further appeal exists to a state circuit
court Court cases are handled by Attorney General staff and, like the Social Security Appeals
Council, the Board of Review tends to remand more cases than it will reverse outright.
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Management and Organizational Structure. The Illinois appeal operation is
managed by a non-lawyer Division Manager (there is no chiefjudge) who reports to a deputy
director of the Employment Security Department (there are five deputies and the Division is
under the deputy for operations). The Employment Security Department is an independent
state agency with cabinet status whose director is appointed by and accountable to the
Governor.
The Appeals division is an operational component of the Department and maintains
its own space at the main headquarters of the Department. The Division operates five hearing
locations for benefit cases (each managed by a supervisory referee). Four of these are in the
Chicago area and one is downstate. All administrative cases are handled out of headquarters.
In addition, the Division outstations I to 2 referees in 15 local claim offices where it would
be inconvenient to send benefit claimants to one of the more distant hearing offices.
The practice of outstationing judges in local claims offices ( a typical location would
be a larger community like Rockford northwest of Chicago) represents the purest form of
co-location of initial claim and hearing functions that currently exist in high volume systems.
The judge referees are more or less permanently assigned to the local Employment Security
facilities and have offices mixed in with the other workers and functional units, all served by
common entrance and reception areas. A tendency for extra-record dialogue between referees
and initial claim evaluators has been noted in these setups, mostly to clarify and fill out records
with respect to clerical and procedural questions.
The Appeals Division is subject to the normal budgetary and employment rules and
controls applicable to other state workers and agencies. Indeed, even the referees are organized
into a bargaining unit and dealt with as such. The Division also receives equipment, space,
automation and maintenance services from other departmental components charged with
these functions.
The Appeals Division plays an important role in policy formulation. It will make
requests for rules, interpretations and regulations, propose rule changes and even draft them,
and comments on proposed policy changes emanating from other sources. However, ultimate
authority for new regulatory and rule issuances remains with the agency head and is
coordinated and effectuated by agency counsel. Uniformity and consistency, as with any
volume operation, is a continuing problem The extensive use of macros is believed to
promote this goal and Board of Review and Court decisions in cases appealed beyond the
hearing level are accorded precedential value upon incorporation in a "digest" of benefit
precedent selectively compiled and issued by Department Legal Counsel. The digest is
transmitted to all levels and mandated to be followed throughout the Department. While the
Appeals Division used to issue its own interpretations, it has discontinued the practice
although occasional "guidance" memos are distributed to adjudicative staff and other workers.
Quality assurance is largely defined by the federal government which provides a
"scoring" mechanism to evaluate hearing and decision quality. This looks, in addition to
major errors of substance, for such items as: "Was rebuttal offered?" "Were exhibits viewed
by the claimant?" "Were hearing witnesses sworn in?" If a high enough grade is achieved,
the federal government will forego its own quality assurance audits and rely on agency
scrutiny for a period of time.
BRITISH INDEPENDENT TRIBUNAL SERVICE
The British Social Security Adjudication Operation. The Independent Tribunal
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Service (ITS) exclusively services the various programs of the United Kingdom's Department
of Social Security (DSS). While SSA-type disability benefits (based upon inability to work)
are an important component in the total workload of administrative appeals in the United
Kingdom (the British call them "invalidity" benefits and, more recently, "incapacity" benefits,
reserving the term "disability" for another group of benefits), its tribunals adjudicate many
more kinds of social insurance claims than SSA's predominant focus on title 11 and title XVI
disability denials. ITS incapacity benefit cases represent about 17% of total filings and are
expected to increase to 30% in 1996.
Receipts of hearing requests in all benefit and program categories have run about
200,000 per year and, in 1994, the ITS matched receipts with dispositions (the British call
them "clearances") for the first lime in 3 years. They did this with the equivalent of about 175
judges (all lawyers who are called "chairmen" because they adjudicate in 3-person tribunals
including two lay members whose composition may change with the type of benefits under
review). This figure is actually a 175-judge equivalent made up of 60 full time chairmen and
about 680 part-time chairmen drawn from practicing attorneys who serve, on average, 2-3
days a month and are paid a "per session" fee. Part time adjudicators are thus used on a mass
basis to meet social insurance workload needs and, indeed, currently handle about 60% of the
ITS workload.
Appeals against DSS benefit determinations occur in about 1% of its cases
(yielding the 200,000 annual filings). This compares with OHA's 18% against an annual
claim intake of roughly 3 million disability claims. These appeals are successful about 45%
of the time and of the ITS denials, about 2500 (2%) go on to the next level of appeal, the
Social Security Commissioners (also appointed by the Lord Chancellor). Cases can be
appealed to this level only on points of law. After the Commissioners, only a handful go on
to the Courts of Appeal (comparable to our federal district and circuit courts), i.e., less than
100 per year.
At hearings the Department of Social Security is generally represented by a
"presenting officer" who explains the Department's position, evidence and rationale for a
denied or reduced benefit. This person is supposed to be more of an "amicus curiae", i.e.,
friend of the court, and not partisan. There seems to be no formal screening or pre-hearing
conferencing program within DSS or ITS but the agency can "supersede" a case that is
appealed ( that is, award the benefit claimed in total, thus avoiding the need for a hearing).
This occurs in about 37% of the appeals filed ( a result close to what SSA expects from its
new "adjudication officer" position and well beyond DDS reconsideration outcomes in recent
years).
Currently ITS appeals are being disposed of in 28-30 weeks on the average.
Tribunals (the 3-person panels) generally dispose of 7-8 cases a day. Virtually no judge (i.e.,
chairman) leaves a hearing office without writing or dictating the decisions for that day's
hearings and ITS requires that decisions be announced on a same day basis even if writing
must be put off due to work pressures.
All ITS judges (tribunal "chairmen") prepare their decisions, i.e., write or dictate
virtually all of them the day of the hearing and without decision writer assistance. Decisions
of ITS judges are literally completed forms which have four items that are filled in, i.e.,
I)evidence received, 2) findings on questions of fact, 3) the decision itself (i.e., short
statement of result), and 4) reasons for decision (i.e. application of facts to statutory provisions
and case law, and why certain evidence has been accepted or rejected). They are generally
quite short and this is true even for affirmations of benefit denials and reductions.
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Management and Organizational Structure. The head of the ITS is a solicitor (a
Circuit Judge assigned to the chief judgeship of ITS) who reports to the Lord Chancellor (the
head of the British judicial system) but is administratively responsible to the Department of
Social Security and dependent on DSS for his budget and resources, negotiating that with
DSS. The President (this title is used rather than "chief judge") is the top official of ITS but
delegates day-to-day management to a "chief executive," retaining administrative
responsibility and strategic decisions for his personal decision. The adjudication operation
functions through six regional offices which process all social security and medical appeals
from beginning to end after filing with the benefits agency, arrange hearings and issue
decisions. There are also 75 permanent hearing sites maintained on a rental basis and about
80 "casual" sites retained as needed (typically in public buildings).
The separate and independent status of the ITS and its dual accountability to DSS
and the judicial branch does not seem to have presented problems of impaired production or
efficiency (at least on the surface). ITS' 175-judge equivalent, in disposing of 200,000 filings
annually, is working at a yearly rate in excess of one million dispositions if it had a thousand
judges. This seems all the more impressive in view of the use of 3-member panels but includes
types of cases with far less complexity and evidentiary demands than SSA.
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
The Social Security Adjudication Operation. The Social Security Administration
(SSA), through its Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA), operates the nation's largest
administrative adjudication system. With current annual filings (Fy 1995) in excess of
570,000 requests for ALJ hearings, dispositions beyond 520,000 cases, a corps of more than
1,050 AL's and a total staff complement in excess of 7,400 workers (inclusive also of a
650-person intermediate appeals operation with 23 Administrative Appeals Judges who
adjudicate appeals from adverse ALJ decisions before they can progress to the federal courts),
this system dwarfs the case receipts and staff-size of all other Administrative Procedure Act
tribunals combined.
Ninety-five percent of SSA's hearings caseload consists of appeals from
unfavorable disability benefit determinations in applications filed under Title II (insured
workers) and Title XVI (means-tested and largely impoverished claimants) of the Social
Security Act, including derivative claimants such as spouses, widows, widowers, children, etc.
The actuarial value of the average disability annuity for an insured worker applicant has been
calculated in the range of $90,000 (not counting the value of dependent entitlements) and the
figure for SSI (Title XVI claimants) would be somewhat less. In addition to disability cases,
OHA also adjudicates a modest number of appeals in old age and survivor benefit cases (
about 5,500 in Fy 1994), an equally modest number of Part A and B Medicare claims for
hospital, doctor, nursing care, etc. expenses (about 15,000 in Fy 1994) and a rapidly
diminishing, indeed, now handful, of Black Lung benefit claims.
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There is representation of claimants in most hearing cases, estimated at roughly
70% , about 80% of which involve attorney services. About 2/3 of case filings actually
progress to an ALJ hearing and decision, the remainder being disposed of by dismissal(10-11%) or allowance of benefits without hearing on the basis of hearing record
documentation and new evidence submissions (about 22-24%). Most case outcomes are
favorable to appealing claimants and their dependents, a condition that has existed for many
years and currently runs at about 68% of all ALJ dispositions. Nevertheless, unfavorable
cases may be appealed to the agency's appellate level tribunal (the 23-judge Appeals Council)
and, thereafter, to the federal courts (U.S. District Courts) on grounds of error of law, abuse
of discretion or lack of "substantial evidence" to support the ALJ's decision. These
subsequent appeal rights now yield roughly 70,000 filings per year for the Appeals Council
and 10,000 filings with U.S. district Courts ( the latter with a history of substantial fluctuation
ranging from 19,000 appeals in Fy 1985 to 5,500 in Fy 1990 and 10,000 in Fy 1995). Court
cases are defended by U.S. Attorneys or, occasionally, regional counsel of the Social Security
Administration.
The adjudication structure gets its appealed cases from SSA field offices (primarily
within SSA's 1300 district office network) after applicants receive word of rejection for
benefits from the state agencies (disability determination services -DDSs) who, by law,
process and initially decide the disability benefit applications responsible for the overwhelming
bulk of the adjudication system's work.
Management and Organizational Structure. The top executive of the SSA
adjudication operation is the Associate Commissioner for Hearings and Appeals. The
Associate Commissioner reports to a Deputy Commissioner of SSA. Under the Associate
Commissioner is (i) the field adjudication operation, headed by OHA's Chief Administrative
Law Judge with 10 Regional ChiefAIJ lieutenants operating out of the rapidly disintegrating(except at SSA) standard 10-federal region configuration and (ii) the Appeals Council
operation, centralized at OHA headquarters in the Washington area and managed by a selected
administrative appeals judge (AAJ) with the Council's other appellate judges located in 20
branches housing the large body of analyst/decision writers needed to enable the AAJs to deal
intelligently with the 3,000+ appeals which each of them must review, decide, and dispose
of each year (many requiring 2 or 3 judge panel action). The Associate Commissioner is, byjob designation, also the chiefjudge of the Appeals Council but can operate in that capacity,
if at all, in only a very small number of cases.
The adjudicative operation has its own budget and budget staff, enjoys personnel
and labor relations services supplied the SSA Human Resources Office and is generally
subject to agency wide personnel, budget, procurement, and automation policies and rules(except that it has a substantial staff operating and maintaining its case information and
tracking system-"HOTS" - ultimately to be merged into a fully integrated SSA operational
and management information system).
Judge recruitment is dictated by existing rules and recruitment procedures for alljudges operating under the Administrative Procedure Act (currently a system in other federal
hands, i.e., the Office of Personnel Management) although SSA is by far the major recruiter
of newjudges. Pursuant to general agency policies, lower and mid-level management officials
are selected by OHA or its oversight Deputy Commissioner, higher level appointments (GS
15) by the Commissioner, and all ALJ/AAJ appointments, transfers and supervisory posts
require Commissioner selection, although interviewing and recommendations are in OHA
hands. Field facilities, supplies and personnel support in OHA's 10 regional offices and 132
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field hearing offices (the latter typically housing 5-10 ALJs and a support staff 4-5 times the
number of AIJ's in a given office) comes from a combination of headquarters management
staff and SSA Regional Commissioner offices, depending on the nature of the support
function.
The Office's role in policy formulation and legal interpretation is basically an
"input" function (but a significant one) with all major decision making in the hands of SSA
headquarters oversight staff (Commissioner, General Counsel, the Supervising Deputy
Commissioner). Local rules for hearing offices have not yet been implemented but the Chief
Judge's operating procedures manual (HALLEX) provides significant guidance for both
internal and external hearing office functions.
It should be noted that the agency's disability process is in state of major overhaul,
including adjudicative components, and even administrative placement, structure and
operation of the adjudication system is currently the subject of "reform" study and realignment
to support the reengineering process now underway. As yet, implementation is in initial and
pilot stages. Major implementation of both operational redesign and organizational
restructuring remains to be accomplished.
APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW SUBJECTS AND MAJOR INFORMATION CONTACTS
IN BENCHMARKING STUDY
DOJ IMMIGRATION CORPS
Anthony C. Moscato, Director, Exec. Office of Immigration
Review
Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge
M. Christopher Grant, Asst. Chief Immigration Judge
BOARD OF Veterans' APPEALS
Charles L. Cragin, Chair, Board of Veterans' Appeals
Ronald R. Aumont, Director of Management and
Administration
BRITISH INDEPENDENT TRIBUNAL SERVICE
Judge Keith Bassingthwaighte, President, ITS
MARYLAND OFFICE OF APPEALS AND HEARINGS
John W. Hardwicke, Chief Administrative Law Judge
Judith S. Singleton, Director of Operations
Ben Rudo, Director of Administration
NEW YORK OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
Russell J. Hanks, Director and Deputy General Counsel
Mark G. Lacivita, Director of Administration
Sharon Silversmith, Director of Systems and Resources
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
Victor Napolitano, Acting Manager, Appeals Division
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CALIFORNIA WORKERS COMPENSATION DIVISION, DEPT. IND.
RELATIONS
Peggy Jones, Chief Deputy Administrative Director
Rich Younkin, Deputy Comm'r, Workers Comp. Appeals Board
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